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ClJ THE OJLTURAL ORIGINS AND TI-IE H1STOR1CAL FORM\TICN
OF THE TRAD ITlClJAL STATE:
s::w THEORETlCAL ~SIDERATIClJS
KLAUS EDER
I
I am neither a professional archeologist
anthropologist; so I have to justify why
professional soci ologi st about the probl em of
formation of the state. There are two reasons.
nor a professional
1 wi 11 talk as a
the origins and the
The fi rst reason i s: 1 am doing research on the int erplay of
cul tural, pol i tical, and econemic factors in the development of
m:xiern society. MJre specifica11y ny research question is: in \OA1at
way and to \OA1at extent "do socio-cultural factors affect the
development of the modern state and \OA1at role does the econamy play
in this process. This research question irrplies an evolutionary
hypothesis: there are different fonns of political organisations
ranging frem 1ess carpl ex to rrore ccnpl ex types; the evoluti on of
these types is shaped (1 avoid intentiona11y the tenn 'detennined')
by developments in the socio-cul tural sphere; these developments
follow a developmental logic in the socio-cultural sphere \OA1ich
structures the different fonns of political organization fcmld in
history.
The second reason is: I have a theoretical interest in testing and
reformulating the basic assumptions of 'Historical Materialism' as a
general theory of societal development(l). By stressing the role of
the social-cul tural fact or I have to reassess the irrportance of
norrmtive and evaluative factors for the constitution of social
format ions and for the change of m:xies of product ion wi thin these
social forrmtions.
Taking the exarrple of state fonmtion as a relevant test case for
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these assUJ1l>tioos I have asked nyself the questioo: is it 'possible
to explain the ongms of the state (roore exactly: of the
tradit iooal state) by seme kind of developmental changes wi thin the
primi tive (I use this term in a noo-pejorative sense) socio-cul tural
world? And in \\hat way are the changes of the political sphere
I
related to modes of productioo based 00 kinship relations?
Posing thi s quest i on I was confront ed wi th the predaninant types of
explanations of the origins of state, explanations \\hieh - for the
roost part can be subsumed under the heading of funct i ooal
theories. Functional theories are characterized by the following
structure of argument: there is seme kind of functional irrperative
in the environment of the system in questioo \\hieh can be met by
functional differentiations and specializatioos of the system in
quest i 00.
In this way Engels has argued(2). Surplus production caused by
increases in the forces ·of production, \\hieh leads to new forms of
the division of laboor; in order to secure these new forms of
division of laboor, the state becanes a functional necessity; thus
the state has to be differentiated oot of the natural bonds of
primitive society. In a similar, seme\\hat roore complex way, Carneiro
has argued(3). Given natural (or social) circonscriptions \\hich
irrpede the segmentary division of a growing population, the society
is faced with the Hobbesian problem of order; the state is the
funct ional solut ion of thi s probl em. WH tfogel takes the i rrigat Ion
system to be a functional irrperative \\hieh makes the state
necessary(4), Fried(S) has taken increasing stratification, defined
as unequal access to basic resoorces v.hich sustain life, and the
resulting exploitation of human laboor as the functional pressures
\Johich cannot be met by internalized social controls; the state then
is a roore adequate functional equivalent to internalized social
controls. Recently B.]. Price(6) has offered a modified version of
Fried's approach, a so-called cluster-interaction~el. It differs
fran the other versioo by analyzing not just a single society 00 the
way to stat ehood, but a clust er of societ i es \Johi eh are in constant
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interactioo 'While under the \\6Y to statehood. She arrives by this
procedure at a rrore cCl'q)lex cooceptioo of envi ronment: it adds to
nature as an envirooment the possibility that within a cluster the
different societies are to eaeh other environments. But besides this
modifieation she proeeeds in the elassieal manner: changes in modes
of produet ioo (understood rrainly in t echnical-inst rumental tenns)
produee ehanges in sodal organizatioos; the intensifieation of
irrigation agrieulture makes ehanges toward state-organizatioos
probable.
Recently Claessen/Skalnik(7) have listed in a systerratie analysis of
several case studies the faetors that have had a relatively direet
influenee upon the 'Road to statehood':
(a) populatioo growth and/or population pressure, (b) war, the
threat of war or eonquest, and raids, (e) eonquest, (d) the
influenee of previrusly existing states(8) They introduee sone
specifieations insofar as they try to relate these variables to
structural and processual aspects of statebuilding; but they doo't
break the elosed circle of funetiooalist arg~ntation.
All these faetors have had s~ere in the world seme rei evance:
but yoo can 't coostruct a general theory of state origins upoo these
variables because yoo al\lJaYs find seme exeept ioos. Therefore R.
Cohen favors the so-called 'systemic approach'. In his 0INl1 words:
'~atever starts the sequence off tends to change other qualities of
political, social, ecooamic, and cultural life so that a number of
different starting points, following different trajectories of
change, very corrparable results ensure"(9). Thus theoretical expla-
nation is reduced to a fonmlistic rmde of argumentation; all
explanatory variables are interdependent, so you have - in the last
instance - to renounce of causal explanattons.
I don 't want to go back to sirrple l'OOI1ocausal explanations. But ....nat
I am interested in is the follawing questioo: ....nat is it that gives
to all these interacting variables a speeific direetioo in such a
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way that the state is a necessary ootcane. To say - as Cohen does -
th&t different trajectories have very carparable results is just
begging the questicn. It is not at all c1ear that a factor or a
combination of factors in the relevant environment must lead to the
sta te; we can' t but say that it can lead to the stat e; rmybe we can
also say that it facilitates the road to statehood - but this is all,
we can say. ~ central questicn is then: ....nat structures the
adaptive process of the system of society in such a way that
specializing and institutionalizing the political functicn in the
state is the necessary outcame. This question is not just a question
for analyzing the fonmation of the state; it is the central question
for every theory of societal development including Historical
Miterialism.
Henderson(lO) has stated succinctly the limitations of the old
evolutionary paradigm: it is a theoretical sirrplificaticn ....nich
allows for a "systermtic concentration upon factors that rmy be
called 'external' to individuals: (a) social factors, or the
ccnstraints irrposed by a few rmjor types of socially structured
situations (econanic, political, ritual, etc.), and (b) ecological
factors (the relationship between t echnology and envi ronment ). 8y
setting all hurmn social behavior within a carparable structural
framework, and assuming that each actor acts sirrply to maximize his
own weal th or power and orders his learning processes toward thi s
end, the scholar rmy readily direct attention to the social and
ecologi cal const raint s that ei ther produce equi 1ibria wi thin and
between groups or else tend to change their structures"(11). What is
lacking - according to Henderson - i s the analysi 5 of syrrbol
syst ems, of cul ture as against soci ety, ....nich are shaped by the
specific capacities of the hurmn mind, by its competences. Cultural
patterns or schermta are as essential parts of a social fonmation as
are its institutional arrangements and environmental conditions.
Same theories of the origins of the state have tried to stress this
subjective factor by giving psychological explanations. Thumwald-
(12) assumed that those people ....no had to herd big flocks of beasts
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learnt the herding of men too. Miclver and Lowie(l3) assumed that
the associational structures of people like the Crew of the Great
Plains or of the Kpelle of Western Africa were the cultural roodel
upon v.hich state-like associatioos coold be erected. Recently E.R.
Service(l4) has tried to interpret the origins of the state as the
result of a kind of social cootract: people accept the state because
they benefit fram it. The state is samething v.hieh is ~ted by the
people out of utilitarian coosiderations, is scrnething v.hieh is
based cn a collective ccnsensus. lt is a learning process by seme
groups of people v.hich is supposed to have structured the adaptive
reacticn to environmental imperatives. These ideas can be taken as a
step in the direction I would like to go. But they are still very
insufficient, they aren't but ad-hoc assumptions about social
learning. Thi 5 i s probably the reason v.hy they didn' t have any
influence upcn the dominant evolut i onary theori es.
Thus we have arrived at the distinction of two cooplementary
perspect ives: a social syst em perspect ive and a social I earning
perspect ive. The social syst em perspect ive analyzes inst i tut i ona 1
arrangements like the state as something \tA1ieh is out of reaeh of
the individual actor, as scrnething \tA1ich is the product of
environmental conditions; in Durkheimian terms: as a social fact
imposed upon social actors. The social learning perspective on the
contrary analyzes institutional arrangements like the state as
something v.hi ch has been produced, generat ed by social actors, as
samething \tA1i eh i s not behind, but between social actors; social
reality is a social construction by social actors (15).
11.
The system perspective and social learning perspective allew to
discriminate between two functions of social acticn: manifest
functions and latent functions.Mmifest functions are the intended
ccnsequences of social acticn, latent functions the unintended
ccnsequences of social action. Thus we are confronted with two types
of social reality \tA1ieh can't be reduced to eaeh other. Distin-
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guishing analytically the intended and unintended consequences of
social acticn we are able to rmke the difference between a hidden
logie and an overt logie of social systems. The overt logic has to
be analyzed as the logie of the nonmtive integraticn of the
expl ici t int ent i cns, int erest s of the social aetors; the hidden
. logie has to be analyzed as the logie of the social aggregaticn of
unintended ccnsequences.
1 ecntend that you find sueh an analytieal distinetion in the theory
of Historical Materialism. It is the distincticn between infrastruc-
ture an superst ructure.
Within the different branches of nnrxist theory structural nnrxism
seems to be the most fruitful elaboraticn of the distinction between
infrastructure and superstructure(16), and - what is "ure relevant
in this case - it has applied this version of Historical ~Bterialism
to the problem of the fonmtion of the state.
I think this distinction is not only valid for modern societies, but
also for primitive societies. Kinship relations rmke up the social
relations of produetion. Using the example of Australian Aborigines
Godelier has made it lucidly clear:
" ... it has been observed that the social relations that govern the
hunting and gathering territories, determine the compositicn of the
groups doing the hunting and gathering, and decide how the product
of these act ivi t i es i s shared cut are relat ions of kinship , i. e. ,
relations of descent , nnrriage, and residence. To be more precise,
we nny observe that the (samewhat) abstract conditicn of appropria-
tion of nature is merrbership in adescent group, which inherits
ccmncn (though 'nonexclusive') rights over the undanesticated
resources of different territories from generation to generation. In
the everyday process of concerete appropriation, what happens is
that consanguineal and affinal relations form the cooperative
framework for hunting and gathering and for the distributicn of
produce. But we need to go farther still, for in practice an
Australian band - a unit of direct, everyday appropriaticn of nature
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- is camposite in structure. It is composed of a central core of ~
descended patrilineally fram a number of carrnon ancestors and heirs
to rights over a given portion of territory; around this core is a
cluster of allies, Le., representatives of different groups that
have ei ther given or received wives in the course of earl ier
generat ions. Thi s provides the group wi th the possibi 1i ty of using
several different territories shouLd the need arise. The chief
feature of the system, then, is the fact of shared ownership of
resourees by a nunber of kinship groups; these kinship groups,
moreover, are not exclusive owners of these rights, since, in
certain eritieal cireumstanees, allied groups also have rights to
the same t erri tory." Oll
But these kinship-i nst i tut ions whi eh serve as relat ions of prcduc-
tions in primitive societies aren't the only institutions ~ich
exist in these societies. It has been an old favorite topie of
social anthropolcgy to overrate kinship and to underrate pol i tical
and religious institutions. 1 would like to use the tenn 'cross
cutting' institutions for the latter type. These irrply ritual
gatherings, confliet resolution aetivities ('legal gatherings').
Thus we have also c:n the level of primitive societies infrastruc-
tural institutions and superstructural institutions. The internal
irrperatives m these two levels of social reality are different:. on
the superstructural level it is 'inner nature', the needs,
aspirations, interests ~ich have to be socially integrated through
institutions; on the infrastructural level it is 'outer nature', the
regulation of activities to appropriate nature, ~ich regulates
sodal relations in a .....'ay that it forms a funetioning system.
I errphasize the distinetion between superstructure and infrastrue-
ture, for it seems to be a central analytieal tool in order to
explain the fornHt ion of the state. On the infrastructural level we
analyze proeesses Vohich are independent of the intentions of the
peopl e eoneerned; they percei ve them as mcment s of a eri si 5, as
samething ~ich is out of their reach. FriednBn(8) (a representa-
ti ve of st ructural .Muxi sm) has gi ven us an analysi 5 of the
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objective logic of a mxl.e of producticn based cn kinship.
Technological ccnditicns are regarded in this mxl.el not as
mobilizing, but as inhibiting factors for a logic of change in this
type of mxl.e of production. In analyzing the gumlao gumsa-cycle
(reinterpreting Leach's Political Systems of Highland Buma(l9) he
takes the hi 11 swidden technology as the limi ting factor upoo the
possible evoluticn of the gumsa system. He assumes that this
technology is the limiting factor Which forces the gumsa system to
return to the gumlao state. Then he tries to werk oot the logic
under the hypothetical cooditioo of a positive change of the
productive technique. He describes this process as follows:
''Relative rank is first established by horizontal exchange, than
cooverted into absolute rank throogh claims cn the supernatural.
With the cootinued growth of surplus and the emergence of the state,
the poli tical hierarchy v.hich had fonnerly been generated by the
ecooanic flows of horizontal exchange canes, fina11y, to daninate
that flow. The chief v.ho becanes a sacred king natura11y appro-
priates all of the cammunity rituals. This is certainly the case for
pre-Han China, v.here all shrines were hoosed in the royal coopoond.
The head of stat e cl irrbs a good deal further up the ancest ral
hierarchy - he is no langer the representative of the cammunity to
the gods, but descends fran the heavens as the representative of the
geds to the cammunity."(20)
Relations of production are daninant in this analysis of state
formation. The historical formation of the state can now be stated
in the following rnanner. Prestate societies are shaped by a specific
mxl.e of production in Which kinship relations function as relations
of production. This determines the systerrdc logic of this structure.
Envi rorunental factors I1BY more or less inhibi t the possible
development of his system. If environmental constraints are absent,
the system develcps up to a point Where the given structure, i .e.
kinship relations;'have to be altered. This is the m:ment Where a
given mode of production is in crisis(2U This is the point fran
....nich on a mxl.e oI production is in the process of its dissolution.
Q1 the other hand one can observe on the superst ructural level a
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strengthening of political and religious ties. Old cross-cutting
inst i tut ions assume a subst itut ive task: they have now to fulfi 11
the integrative functions the mode of production can't guarantee any
rrore. Political authority and supematural cererronial activities
fulfill this substitutive function. But in fulfilling this function
superstructural restrictions have to be met. Superstructures being a
manifest function of social action have to be consensual structures.
This irrpl ies that the state being a structure of dcmination has to
rely upon the consent of those dcminated. This is the reason why -
as Godelied22) has pointed oot - the emerging political relations
have to present themselves as an exchange of goods and as an
exchange of services. This exchange irrplies - for it is just a
substitutive mechanism (this is a point against Godelier) - the
involvment of invisible realities, imaginary means of reproduct ion ,
\\hich depend for existence upon a specific type of consciousness in
these societies. And this is the point, where cultural factors
interfere directly in the formation of the state.
The historical formation of the state is thus determined by two
interrelated processes: the strengthening of political and religious
ties and the weakening of relations of production based on kinship.
We can now translate this descriptive statement into a theoretical
statement: it is the dissolution of the systemic logic of a mode of
productian and the construction of a new rroral order by institutian-
building which expla'ins the formation of evolutionary innovations
like the state. And within this theoretical conception is it
possibl e todefine the stat e by i t s manifest and lat ent funct ion:
its manifest function is to integrate people within an hierarchical
institutianal framework, its latent function is to serve as a social
;
structure \\hich prevei1ts fission(23), which breaks and substitutes
the systemic logic of segmentary differentiation.
111.
The distinction between infrastructure and superstructure wasn't but
a step. \'lhat 1 want to discuss now, is the theoretical base upon
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~ich this distinction has been founded ~thin Historical Materia-
list theories.
Two opposing theoretical traditions, cultural lTIiterialism(24) and
structural (French) Marxism(2S) have offered against this dualism a
tertium quid: culture. But they are divided as to how to analyze
cul ture. This divi sien has been known as the divi sien between 'emic'
and 'etic'-approaches(26). Emic-procedures are those in ~ich social
actien is described thrcugh categories and relations 'Ahich are
appropriate and meaningful to native actors; etic-procedures are
those 'Ahich describe social action thrcugh categories and relations
developed independently by a camunity of observers. At first sight
this seems to be nothing but a methodological oppositien. But it has
far-reaching consequences: i t det ermines the cent ent of cul ture and
thus the cenceptualizaticn of the meaning of social acticn. The
cultural logic 'Ahich determines the meaning of actien is conceptua-
lized in etic~rocedures as a universal logic of utilitarian acticn,
as social action oriented by material advantage. In emic-procedures
this utilitarian aspect is itself variable according to the cultural
defini tions given by sane people to ~at they consider to be to
their advantage. In this latter conceptualizatian the term 'advan-
tage' is itself an enpty cancept to be filled ~th cultural mea-
ning(27). These cultural definiticns of acticn serve as definiticns
of the goal-states of social systems.
What I \IW1t to show is how the definition of culture affects the
canceptualizaticn of a social fornatian (28). As far as cultural
materialism is ccncerned there is an ambiguity in what exactly fixes
the goal-state of a social fornaticn. There are two - Sahlins called
them - naturalistic models: the model of ecological adaptation and
survival and the model of lTIiXimaticn of advantage. The fi rst inpl ies
cnly a mininum necessary funct ioning, anything over the mininum
being adaptive. The second inplies the generalizatian of the modern
boorgeoi s acqui sit ive interest (the capi tali st ethic in Weber I s
terms) as an anthropological universal; this is a reprojectian of
cur own notian of culture upcn all historical societies. But the
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deeisive objeetion is: the logie of action which underlies eultural
materialist thinking is not a legie of soeial action, but a legie of
instrumental and strategie action. And such a legic will never be
able to analyze soeial evolutionary processes.
The result of this approach for the eonceptualization of a social
fonnation is a naturalization of a marxist strategy: the rrode of
production is not defined first of all by the social relations of
production, but by the productive forces in a wide sense(29); the
superstructure (or rrode of reproduction) is not defined as the
mechanism of social integration of social relations of product ion ,
but as a ~stification of an instrumental legic underlying as weIl
the rrode of production as the rrode of reproduction.
This eonceptualization is a reductionist version of the conception
of a social fonnation. It is based on a non-social conception of
action and is methodolegically linked (I leave open the question
....nether this is necessarily so) to et i c-operat i onal procedures.
Insofar as this conception can be taken as the roost general
fomulation of the functionalist paradigm \\hich has dcminated
evolutionary thinking, certainly with respect to the question of the
formation of the state, I have to refute this approach because of
theoretical and methodolegical weaknesses. This does not imply that
I hold the results of the empirical work done within this
theoretical tradition obsolete. On the contrary: quest ions of
dernography, geegraphical loeation, nutri tional equi I ibria etc. are
important aspects in the explanation of societal change. What I
contend are the theoretical claims linked with cultural materialism.
\lmat I want to do is to strengthen the structuralist marxist
paradigm (Godelier, Friedmann). Godelier(30) uses the term 'ideel I
to describe the cul tural side of a social formation. Ideel elements
are contained already in productive forees (f .e. the knowledge of
nature by natives as analyzed in ethnoscience). They are also
contained in each social relation. The idea is that "all social
relations arise and exist sirrultaneously both in thought and ourside
of it .•. The ideel element exists not only in the form and content
of consciousness, but in the form of all those aspect s of social
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relations that make them relations of signification and make their
meaning or meanings rmnifest"(3l). Explicitly Godelier adopts here
an emic-operational procedure that relates social action to the
cultural meanings social relat ions have for the people concemed.
This cultural definition of reality is by itself sodal, for
meanings are by nature intersubjectively shared; they detennine
social practice. As Godelier puts it: t1 ••• thought not only
interprets reality, but actually organizes every kind of social
practice on the basis of this reality, thereby contributing to the
production of new sodal realities" (3la).
Thus the conceptualization of a social forrmtion is based on a
sodal action perspective. lt is not - as in cultural rraterialism-
a naturalization, but a culturalization of a Mirxist strategy. The
mode of production is first of all defined by its social relations
of production; the superstructure (the mode of reproduction) is
defined as a mechanism of social integration. This conceptualization
amounts to a sociological conception of a social forrmtion.
IV.
Thus far I have concentrated the theoretical argument upon the
sociological conception of a social forrmtion and its relevance for
the explanation of the forrmtion of the state. In this chapter I
want to consider the problem how social relations exist in thought
(and not, as bef ore, how they exi st out side of i t in a socia1
forrration). What I will do is to develop the topic of the ideel
element in social explanation and its relevance for the formation of
the state.
To make sure that I cantt be misunderstood I want to add at once
that I don't contend that the ideel element is a causal mechanism of
sodal change; this walld irrply an idealistic position. What I want
t 0 cont end isthat the ideel el ement i 5 aft er having been
confronted wi th an increasing amount of changes in the social world
- reorganized in adefinite way. I interpret this definiteness as
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the consequence of a developmental logic of ~olic structures(32).
Synbol ic st ructures develcip in a sequence of st ructurally di screte
stages. This is the idea of an evolution of the ideel element.
To start wi th such an hypothesi s you have to assume that thi s ideel
element is not a fixed reservoir, an Olltological given, but that it
is the result of a generative synbolic praxis. This point of a
cultural creativity in the synbolic praxis has been rmde by M.
Sahlins:
''The etemal problem of this syrrbolic ecOllcrry of praxis is not
scarcity, as in the boorgeois conception of econanic rationality,
but a surplus at once of obj ect ive means and of conceptual ends. The
world, on one hand, is too rruch with us: in the great variety of
objects and their several attributes that it rmkes available to any
society, reality affords a potential surfeit of enpirical distinc-
tions. On these each historic group operates selectively, valorizing
certain rmterial features .....nile ignoring others, and so realizes
after its own fashion the objectivity of the objective world. On the
other hand, apart fran the negative natural limits, the range of
meanings attributable to the objective distinctions is apriori
unlimited - the syrrbol being 'stirrulus-free'. Each society thus
integrates a selective set of objective features according to a
project of ~olic constructicn .....nich is never the only Olle
possible. Such is the double action of culture in nature, analytic
and SYnthetic, a segmentation of natural differences in the service
of a cultural scheme."(33)
This is an iJll>ortant rermrk. Culture has a generative capacity: this
can be 1 inked wi th the idea of Godel ier that cul ture (the ideel
element) produces new social realities. What 1 want to do ncrw is to
push this point one step further and see .....neter the historical
variabi 1i ty of cul tura I schemes i s just randan or .....nether thi s
variability is itself a product of a cultural evoluticn, of an
evolut ion of socially relevant meaning systems. 1 wi 11 propose the
idea of a moralevoluticn of the structures of a syrrbolic praxis and
then refomulate the problem of the historical forrmtion of the
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state according to this symbolistic perspective. And the proposition
is: to explain the fonmtion of the state you have first of all to
explain how the idea of the state originates in the mind of social
actors. ~ ccntention is: the state is first of all not an
organizaticnal phenanencn nor a structure funeticning as a relation
of production, but it is an idea, a 'modele culturel I in Touraine's
terms, Vohi eh gives the developmental processes co the infrast ruc-
tural and superstructural level a nonmtive direction. Posing the
problem of state origins (not state fonmticn) in thi s way 1 have to
look for quite another process than usual in order to explain them.
What I have to look for is the proeess whereby the idea of the state
is eonstrueted, Le. I have to analyze the syrrbolie ccnstruction of
the idea of the state(34).
The idea of the state (and this idea has been called 'state' since
Aristoteles) is the cognitive representatico of a specific social
relationship. The state is - to push the definitional aspect a step
further - a eogni tive ecoception of social relationships having a
moral meaning. But how do we get at the moral meaning of the idea of
the state?
Besides the methodological question how to operationalize such a
propositico we are confronted with the theoretical question what
these so-called 'structures ' or structuring principles of the
symbolic praxis exactly are.
Syrrbolic anthropology(35) has - in its turn against the daninant
anthropological errpiricism - provided the ground for this approach.
In i t s most el ementary sense the word idea has becane SYn0nym::::Us
with 'difference', be it the difference between 'we' versus 'they',
'eulture' versus 'nature', 'pure' versus 'irrp.ure'. The eognitive
operator lying behind these differences is binary differentiation.
Binary st ruetures have been the basi s for the syrrbol ie-st ruetural
approach to the ideel aspeet of social real i ty. lt allowed for the
identification of sone orderly strueture in a mass of incoherent and
superficially unrelated phenanena.
- 124 -
The rrodels generated by binary differentiation represent an ideal
plan of social reality; behind the rrore or less distorted syrrbolic
performance by social actors there are ideal plans for this
perfotrmnce. These rrodels change fran society to society in its
cal'lJlexity. This i"l'lies to acknowledge the historical variability
of such ideal plans. To accO\.mt for this varying carplexity it is
necessary to look at the 'Way how different binary structures are
related to each other. They are ranked with respect to each other in
a specific 'Way and this is a second cognitive mechanism~ich allows
for the construction of increasingly carplex rrodels. And ny
contention is: these ranking procedures have a rroral meaning. ~
intention i s to broadenthe syrIDolic st ructurali st approach in a
double way: to give a developmental accO\.mt of the historical
variability of cognitive rrodels(36) and to stress the relational
aspect within these models as constitutive for their rroral meaning.
Bpth aspects are· intenelated. ~ thesis is: ...mat changes in a
developmental sequence i s the type of ranking which gives to
cognitive orderings a. specific moral meaning.
MJrality in early non-state societies is characterized as a mode of
cognitive ordering ...mich is constructed in accordance with analo-
gical orderings of the natural universe(37). This analogical
relationship between culture and nature shapes the kind of ranking
possible in this rrodel. It is restricted to a kind of natural
hanmony to ...mich man subordinates hirnself. The corresponding
rmrality is the rmrality of concrete solidarity ...mich allows for
ranking wi thin natural groups but not between them. Thi s doesn' t
exclude to have a family head, to give inferior status to wanen
(rrore seldan to men), i.e. sexual ranking and also age-ranking. As·
long as the cognitive dichotomy of nature-culture and its analogical
relations hold, ranking is bO\lnd to concrete interactive rrorality.
MJral sanct ions are dependent upon the obj ect ive consequences of
action for the maintenance of interactive relationships.
As soon as the concept i on of nature becanes anbiguous - and thi s
happens wi th the enlargement of craftmanship - nature i t self i s
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being divided into two realms: that of poiein and that of
prattein(38) (to use a culturally familiar exanple). The unitary
cmceptim of nature is broken, nature is divided into the natural
(that \\hich can be handled instrumentally) and the supematural
(that Which has to be cammunicated with). Having thus rationalized a
part of nature social conscic:usness can const ruet a supernatural
world Which is related to culture not by analogy, but by
superordination: supernature becomes a higher level natural order.
The basic notion is the belief in a parallelfsm between Macrocosmos
and Microcosmos, between the universe and the world of men. Ranking
can now be based on hierarchical and authoritarian patterns.
M::>rality is now the authoritarian postulate of a coopelling 'higher'
order. Thus binary differentiations can be brought into a hierar-
chical order. A case in point is the caste system. Here yc:u find the
binary distinctions of nature - culture, material - immaterial. pure
- impure in an hierarchical order Which produces the ideal image of
soci ety:
Sudra
(ag r i cuI tu ra I ist 5 )
(unfree peasant 5
Vai sya
merchants
(fanners)
IKshat riya
I (warri ors and
Iroyality)
IBrahmans
I (priests)
I
nature Iculture material I Immaterial Impure Ipure
(according to R.N. Adams (39)
M::>rality nowdepends on the conformity with a given normative order.
Individual guilt and punishment define the structure of moral
sanct ion.
As soon as this conception of the supernatural is put into question
by the rationalization of the supernatural, the problem of theodicy
arises: how is it possible that an ideal world of God(s) presides
over such an imperfect and unjust social world (this is the dominant
topic of Weber's sociology of world religions(40). This breaks up
the uni tary st ructure of the supernatural ; i t poses the probl em of
individual responsibility vis-a-vis the will of God(s). The division
between humm nature cn the one hand and natural law cn the other
hand arises; but they are still tied together as aspects of the
supernatural order. But by rationalizing the idea of a hurmn nature
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and secularizing the idea of natural law new relations binding the
soeial world together had to be found.
\\hat happens is the establishment of an egalitarian relationship
between and ~thin binary oppositions. The ideal model of soeiety is
egalital'ian, with 'hcmo aequalis' as its referenee po'int«4l). The
philosophi eal erit ique of natural law i s the last tuming point:
rmn becanes the measure of all things(42). M:.:lral i ty ean now be
loeated ~ thin rmn, as a set of priori principles everybcdy TTUst
follow using his reason. Individual responsibility is the eriterion
of moral sanetion.
These aren' t but cursory rermrks eonceming the idea of a moral
evoluticn. But they give an irrpressicn as to how a developmental
sequence, stages of cegnitive orderings and moral orderings ean be
construeted. The stages I have distinguished above have also been
called the preccnventional, the conventional and the postconven-
tional stage(43). This tenninology has been borrowed fram the theory
of moral development in ontogeny(44). I think it has - in the
process of elaborat i cn - beeame cl ear that the stage level of an
interaetive morality is constitutive for an ideal model of pre-state
social structures. It characterizes an institutional system by bonds
of solidarity and reciprocity; breaking these bonds ealls forth a
typical reacticn of society: ritual cleaning and legal self-help are
the mechan i sms which restore the broken order. The infrastructural
system based cn kinship can be interpreted as a system the limits of
~ich are defined by the nonmtive legie of possible kin-relations.
The stage. level of authoritarian morali ty (or conventional mora li ty)
is constitutive for an institutional order characterized by
authority relationship; it is here that the state emerges as a moral
idea and then as an institutional fonn. The break of the nonmtive
bonds of superordination/subordination is met by religious condemna-
tian and by legal sancr"ion of a political authority. On the
infrastructural level patron-cl ient-relationships define the strue-
tural limits of newly emerging m:xies of prcd.uction. The stage level
of a principled (or posteonventional) morality is - as evident -
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characteristic for modern society. Formal rule of law on the super-
structural level, a roode of producticn based upcn legally free
individuals are the results of this stage of moral evolution(45).
Having definded the ideel el ement \Jlich i s const i tut ive of stat e
structures I can cane back to the questicn, how this cognitive
structure is generated within the real life of a society. 1 will
make the attempt to bring together the points made in chapter 11 and
111 and offer a theoretical formulation of the cultural origins and
historical fonrn.ticn of the traditional state (and ycu notice: this
is the full title of this paper).
v.
In a situat ion \\here a mode of product ion reaches i t s syst emic
limits a sodal fonrn.tion tends to rely for Hs survival upon
reproduct ive st ructures (superst ructures). These st ructures then
assume (j. leading function in social evolution. The synDolic sphere
direct1y affects the development of a social formation. By its
generative potential the ideel element produces new institutional
devices by \Jlich the social conflicts resulting fran the "hyperde-
velopment" of a mode of productien can be regulated. The task now
will be to explain the process by \Jlich cognitive models are
changed. What we have gained by a theory of moral evolut i Ct1 for the
problem of the cultural origins of the state is a model of the ideal
functioning of political institutions en different moral levels.
This theory asswnes that - in order to have the stqte as a social
institutien - ycu have to have a cenventional mode of moral thinking
in society. This irrplies that the fonmtion of the state is
correlated with the formatien of a conventional mode of reasoning.
Service(46) has made a similar point in his last book. The
institutionalization of leadership roles (\Jlich give more adaptabi-
lity to decision-imking procedures) is legitimated supematurally,
not habitually; it is further backed up by new types of cenflict
resolution in society. Conflicts aren't resolved any more infor-
mally-publ icly; they are resolved by a neut ral thi rd perscn \Jlich
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has the right to binding decisions. The problem is to explain how in
the process of poli ti cal evolut icn start ing in prestate soci et ies
such a thinking, such a cognitive-nx>ral structure develops. At the
end of chapt er 111 I ment i oned a possible causal mechan i sm. In order
to fulfill the function of relations of production in a dissolving
kinship rrode of producticn the political institutions have to
present them~elves as maintaining reciprocal exchange relations. To
do this political institutions have to have a monopoly (an exclusive
property) over imaginary means of product Ion (47) ; but these
imaginary means have to be invent ed and have to be want ed by
everybody. Thi s pre-supposes a change in the rel igious ordering of
the world; syrrbolic praxis is rmde rroving. The change \J1ich is
logically possible consists in the division of nature accessible to
everybody and the "supernature" accessible only to those \J10 have a
mor~ di rect relat Ion 'Ni th the gods. The ranking of nature (opposing
lower spirits against higher deities) involves a change in moral
cutlook: it allows for an authoritarian transfonmtion of political
inst itut ions.
This ,step tov.ard a reorganization of the religious syrrbol system is
linked to a first type of state-like institutions: the theocratic
state. Theocracies are different fram primitive political institu-
tions because of their reliance upcn supernatural reinforcements and
sanctions. This is the cognitive aspect of political evolution.
Theocratic organization irrplies first of all the change of
institutional practices. Rituals have been substituted. by ceremonia-
li sm; priests and t errpl es emerge. as adequate forms of social
organizaticn of ceremonialism. Within this institutional structure a
first fonn of political damination, the theocratic fann of political
institution has developed. This change has manifestly a self-serving
function(48), namely the legitirmtion of a differential access to
palitical power, But it had also a system-serving functicn: it was
more flexible than ritualistic forms of decision-flRking and
conflict-resoluticn; it was better able to solve the problems of a
rrode of production still being based on kinship. The new
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institutional device was not only more flexib~e, but it could also
introduce new sodal structures wtlich could function as social
I.
relations of productien 1 narnely patfen-client-relationships. Thus we
have two nndes of production on this level of institutional
development: a dissolving and an enlerging mode of productien, the
emerging mode of production being the latent function of a symbolic
universal \OAlich organizes action en the level of a cenventional
moral i ty.
Webster(49) has made an atterrpt to describe the theocratic type of
d anina t i en a s a tran s i t i ana I f 0 nn t owa rd a f u 11 bl own s tat e . He
points to the fact that early states (including advanced chi efdcms 1
didn't have yet enough organized power to be effective a1 the legal
level. So they had to rely upon ideological power, at least as lang
as coereive institutions WereIl't developed. The mler has power only
because of his moral exanple wilich gives to hirn the rronopoly of
moral sanction. Supernatural sanctions were necessitated by the
ineffective centralization of coercive force, and they were feasible
because of the srmll size and the relative homogeneity of early
states. Theocratic institutions are relying upon legitirmte values
wilich presuppose an al ready vertically structured syrrbolic universe,
a universe which contains the cognitive model of authoritarian
relations, of a conventional morality.
This conception of a theocratic type has been fomulated in a
sirnilar manner by Claessen/Skalnik(50):
Chiefdans are socio-political organizations with a centralized
government, hereditary hierarchical status arrangements with an
aristocratic ethes, but no fonml, legal apparatus of forceful
repressim, and withoot the capacity to prevent fission. These
organizations seem to be universally theocrat ie, wi th submi ssion to
authori ty taking the form of that of a rel igic:us congregation to a
eh i e f -p ri es t . " ( 51 ) .
This form.l1ation raises again the old question wilether these
theocracies were just chiefdams or whether they were already states.
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If yoo look only for institutional features, then this questian is a
semantic problem and therefore no problem at all. 1t is nothing but
a definitional problem of the scientific cc:mnmity. When you look
for normative features, it is clear that theocracies contain already
authori tarian st ruetures, but these are authori tarian st ructures
\\hich are restrieted to the religious sphere. A full blown state is
given, \\hen authoritarian structures have transfonned the legal
sphere too. Exarrples for a theocratic stage in poli tieal evolution
are found - according to Webster - in early Chinese state formation
Where the emperor was characterized by ritual and liturgical
prerogatives \\hieh never could be trespassed by loeal "big men".
This stage of evolution lasted long in Chinese history, and Webster
pointed out that thi 5 "weakness" of legal centralization was a
guarantee of institutional stability in a vast regien with a tiny
per capi ta surplus prcduct i ord 52), Early Mesopotamia i 5 another
ease. Here we find - for the time of literary evidence - religioos
and legal positions in campetition with each other. The 'en' was the
head of the terrple eorporation in Protoliterate times; during early
Dynastie period the 'lugal' Oiterally: great rmn) characterized by
miiitary functions also emerged; he gave rise to the 'ensi', the
temple leader acquiring legal control as well(53). The religious and
the seeular legal element are now functionally separated, but
contained within religious institutions. Similar campetitions
between religicus and militaristie leaders are reported for Central
Mexico (the follower of QuetzalcoatI versus the supporters of
Tezcatlipoca)(54), for Egypt (the rivalry between terTl>le organiza-
ti on and the Pharaoni c bureaucracy), and last not least, the
competition between church and state in the early middle ages.
This theocratic stage is but a first step toward the full blO\o.n
state. The second step is Yklat M. Weber called the "Verall täg-
lichung" of the theoeratic form of domination (Yklich can be equated
with W1at Weber called charisrmtic type of dcrnination). Political
institutions have to become more secular, more normal in an everyday
sense Ut was preearicus for all supematurally legitirmted rulers
to survive, if - f .e. - they couldn't bring about the rain needed
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for agriculture). Daninaticn had to be switched fran the religicus
value sphere to the legal nonmtive sphere. Legalizaticn was the
mechan i sm of the ''Vera11 tägli chung" of theocrat ic daninat i cn. Thi s
rrakes up the rm.ture state. lt is an institution \J\ich is secular,
raticnal and has appropriated the legal functicn at least insofar as
the ruler is the final judge in society, as his sayings are law.
. Service has rm.de this point too: ''basically the problem is the
bureaucratic cne of how to transform charisrm.tic hierarchies of
leadership into institutionalized, pemanent offices."(SS).
Thi s secular or - as I pref er it - thi s 1egal stage of poli t i cal
evoluticn is a transfomaticn of ncn.re1igicus insti tutional
arrangements in prestate societies. Whereas the theocratic form is
an .evoluticn cut of the ritual c<:.t1lJlex, legal forms of political
dominaticn are derivOO fran the mechanisms of conflict resoluticn in
pre-state societies. In contrast to pre-state mechanisms of conflict
resolution pol itical authori ty has the right to final judgment in
conflict resoluticn. The underlying cognitive model remains the same
as in the theocratic stage. What happens is an application of the
model upcn the 1egal sphere. What has been changed here? The
self -help of kin-grcups i 5 subst itut 00 by stat e-organi zoo judicial
procedures; it is not retaliaticn, but punishment \>.hich underlies
the procedures of coo.flict resolution; it is not collective
responsibility, but indiviqual gUilt \>.hich serves as the measure of
legal sanctiari; it is not private vengeance, but lawand order \>.hich
characterizes legal actim(S6). The new legal procedures have a
self -serving funct ion: by thei r very st ructures they produce the
moral legitimatim of authority, the acceptance of lawand order. It
has al so a syst em-serving function: i t 1imi t s the ext ent and
econanic costs of interkingroup conflicts (Le. blood feuding); it
. rmkes merri:>ership in a society dependent upon juridical definitions,
and thereby it gives a legal backing to patrcn-client-relaticnship.
Thus the institutional frame for the functioning of patrcn-client-
relationships in ,a social fomaticn is constructOO. The new state
has emergOO as the eross-eutting institution \\hieh replaees or at
'least rmkes seeondary the old and ''primitive'' mechanisms of social
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integration. This new model of social relationships ean now became
the starting point for the formation of a new mode of production.
To grasp thi 5 process theoret ically I have di st ingui shed between
manifest and latent funetions of soeial action. The fonmatian of the
state is the rmnifest funetion, the fomation of a new roode of
productian the latent funetion of a eognitive switch frem a
preauthoritarian to an authoritarian roorality. The fomation of a
roode of produetian is not an intentional process; only after having
reorganized the institutional framework a new roode of productian can
eane into being. And how this mode of production is shaped, depends
upon envircnmental, ecologieal condi tiens.
The rrost sirtple m:xle of produetion based on patron-client-re-
latiooship seems to he the feudal mode of produetion. The ruler i5 a
rroral person .....tlc i 5 dependent for poli t i ea I power upen loeal
ITBgnates, loeal big men. This mode i5 the rrore stable the n:ore vast
and geographically diversified the terri tory to rule i s. Relati ans
of productian d~elc:p in this case as a result of the subordination
of village ecmnmities to loeal rmsters. This is a transitory rnex1e
of produeticn. The so-called Asiatie roode of productirn is a
functional equivalent to the feudal roode; it is the result of very
speci fi c ci rcumstances, namely the nearly total dependence of
productive work upon irrigation. This calls for the l~gal subordina-
tim of Ioeal nngnates and thereby a n:ore direct subordinaticn of
producers to central authority. The patrcn-client-relationship Is
then defined by thc social relaUrn between ruler and the working
people. This roode also seems to be a transitory rrode. \'mat has
becane dcrninant in the evoluticnary proeess were the slave m:xies of
produetion and the ''European'' m:xie of producticn. In the ancient
mxle of produeticn (slave rrode of produeticn) urban centers, city
states, assumc the role of the soeial integration of the patrons;
their eeoncmic base has been the rural populace and later on the
slaves. 1ne European mode of produetian 15 a developrnent out of the
feudal roode; it is the substituticn of early feudalism by systems of
estates/corporations ~ich are econcmically based. upan personal
subord.inaticn of peasants and craftsmen.
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I don't want to go deeper into these speculations. I just wanted to
show ycu the line of further inqui ry of the development of the
tradit ional state and it s accrnpanying roodes of product ien en the
basis of the proposed theory of societal changes.
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